

SECRET

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Chapter Six

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Common Ground With New Partners (U)

From 1946 through 1948, American intelligence officials in Washington were ambivalent, if not wary, of establishing contact with Ukrainian emigres in Germany.¹ They regarded the exiled groups as splintered and vulnerable to Soviet penetration. At the same time, American intelligence officers at Headquarters realized that these groups had a record of employing terrorist measures and supporting the Nazis. The opportunistic nature of the Ukrainian groups called into question the extent to which the United States should become involved with the emigres. (S)

As the Cold War deepened, American rationalization for using these anticommunist groups underwent a subtle, but crucial transformation. After 1948, the Central Intelligence Agency moved to cooperate with the Ukrainians against the Soviets as opposed to merely collecting information on the emigre movements. This denoted a major shift from the approach that Headquarters took in 1946 and 1947. As a result of this new cooperation, the CIA launched its first attempts to penetrate the Iron Curtain.² The Ukrainians and other Eastern and Southern European emigre groups now became

¹Portions of this chapter appear in condensed form in Ruffner, "Cold War Allies: The Origins of CIA's Relationship with Ukrainian Nationalists," in [] [] , *Central Intelligence: Fifty Years of the CIA*, pp. 19-43. (S)

²Winston Churchill at Fulton College in Missouri said on 5 March 1946, "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent." (U)

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linked to the CIA's own clandestine efforts against the Soviets during the Cold War. The development of such relationships eventually raised questions about American intelligence using men with unsavory backgrounds who had allied themselves with America's enemies only a few years previously. (S)

Terra Incognita (U)

Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the Director of Central Intelligence from 1947 to 1950, was reluctant to involve CIA with emigre groups in Europe despite pressure from other Federal agencies, including the Army and the Department of State. In early March 1948, Frank Wisner, a former OSS officer and a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, proposed that the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC) form an ad hoc committee to explore the use of Soviet émigrés. The SANACC took up Wisner's proposal and circulated his paper, *Utilization of Refugees from the Soviet Union in U.S. National Interest* (SANACC 395), on 17 March 1948. Shortly afterwards, the ad hoc committee, composed of members from State, Army, CIA, and several other agencies, began exploring the paper's implications.³ (U)

Wisner wanted SANACC 395 to "increase defections among the elite of the Soviet World and to utilize refugees from the Soviet World in the national interests of the US." Describing the history of the Russian anticommunist movement since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and Russian collaboration with the Nazis in World War II, Wisner felt that the 700,000 Russians scattered in European DP camps and elsewhere

³State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee 395, *Utilization of Refugees from the Soviet Union in US National Interest*, 17 March 1948, located in Scholarly Resources, Inc., National Security Policy of the United States, LM-54, Roll 32, SWNCC Case Files Nos. 382-402 March 1947-June 1949, NARA. (U)

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around the world could provide the bulwark of a new anti-Soviet movement. The Russian émigrés, Wisner claimed, represented “the potential nucleus of possible Freedom Committees encouraging resistance movements into the Soviet World and providing contacts with an underground.” According to Wisner, the United States remained “ill-equipped to engage in the political and psychological conflict with the Soviet World,” and the “Soviet satellite areas like the USSR are tending to become a terra incognita.” American ignorance of the Soviet Union in all fields and at all levels, he lamented, was profound and growing.⁴ (U)

With SANACC's approval, Wisner planned to “remove present deterrents and establish inducements” to spur defectors among the Soviet elite. He also wanted to increase the utilization of these refugees “to fill the gaps in our current official intelligence, in public information, and in our politico-psychological operations.” At the same time that the special group began to review SANACC 395, the State Department requested that CIA prepare a study in accordance with Paragraph 6 of the SANACC 395's recommendations and report its findings to the committee.⁵ Navy Capt. Alan McCracken, CIA's Deputy Assistant Director of Special Operations (DADSO), served as the Agency's interim point of contact for SANACC 395. McCracken expressed great reservations about the overall value of Soviet defectors, and he rejected most of Wisner's proposals. A naval officer detailed to CIA, McCracken criticized the State Department for wanting to establish a “social science institute composed of refugee and American scholars for the purpose of doing basic research studies on the Soviet World.” McCracken considered “this proposal nothing but expensive hot air” just as he rejected

⁴Ibid. (U)

⁵W.A. Schulgen, Acting Secretary, SANACC, to Members, 18 March 1948, SANA-5983, LM-54, Roll 32, NARA. (U)

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bringing Russians to the United States. "I do not think **any** [original emphasis] 'social science scholars' will do us a particle of good—we have too damned many of this type of faker in the US already."⁶ (C)

Capt. McCracken also noted that he had no "objection to making a study, but I cannot see that the refugee mass will be useful." He did, however, support thoroughly interrogating defectors, and believed that "OSO is in a position to furnish a certain amount of details on the capabilities of anti-Soviet refugees for intelligence purposes and can supply additional data on the many factors connected with the utilization of these groups and individuals for other than intelligence purposes."⁷ (C)

Hillenkoetter's Response (U)

Adm. Hillenkoetter provided his own comments on SANACC 395 to the National Security Council on 19 April 1948. Responding to the problem statement "whether the mass of refugees from the Soviet world, now in free Europe and Asia can be effectively utilized to further US interests in the current struggle with the USSR," the DCI told the NSC:

1. During the past three years, CIA (and its predecessors) has systematically explored the potential intelligence value of the numerous anti-Communist and

⁶DADSO, Alan R. McCracken, Memorandum to Chief, Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS), "Utilization of Soviet Refugees," 29 March 1948, (C), in DO Records, [redacted] Box 1, Folder 13, CIA ARC. This same document is also found in DO Records, [redacted] Box 1, Folder 10, CIA ARC. McCracken's memo was in response to a request for comments by [redacted] [redacted], ICAPS chief and CIA's representative to the staff of the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. See Chief, ICAPS, to ADSO, "Utilization of Refugees from the Soviet Union in US National Interest," 23 March 1948, ER-8618, (C), DO Records, [redacted] [redacted], Box 1, Folder 13, CIA ARC. (C)

⁷Ibid. (C)

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anti-Soviet groups in Central and Eastern Europe. Contacts have been developed with the leading groups of the mass of Soviet émigrés, e.g., Ukrainians, Georgians, Balts and White Russians. Although these contacts were established primarily for purposes of procuring intelligence on Eastern Europe and the USSR, sufficient overall information on these groups has been inevitably gathered to permit a sound evaluation of their possible value to the US Government for the purpose of propaganda, sabotage and anti-Communist political activity.

2. On the basis of experience and careful analysis CIA has found the following characteristics in every group in the mass of Soviet émigrés.

a. These groups are highly unstable and undependable, split by personal rivalries and ideological differences, and primarily concerned with developing a secure position for themselves in the Western world.

b. They have been completely unable to provide intelligence of real value since they are rarely able to tap useful sources of information within the USSR, and generally concentrate on producing highly biased propaganda materials in place of objective intelligence.

c. They are almost exclusively interested in obtaining maximum support (usually from the US) for their own propaganda activities and insist upon the provision of substantial financial, communications, propaganda, movement and personal assistance in return for vague and unrealistic promises of future service.

d. They immediately capitalize upon any assistance which they receive to advertise the fact of official (US) support to their colleagues and to other governments in order to advance their own personal or organizational interests.

e. These groups are a primary target for Soviet MGB and satellite security agencies for purposes of political control, deception and counterespionage. CIA has sufficient evidence at this time to indicate that many of these groups have already been successfully penetrated by Soviet and satellite intelligence agencies.
(S)

Hillenkoetter concluded, "the large mass of these people cannot be effectively used in time of peace." He added, "in the event of war, on the other hand, the possible value to the US Government of large numbers of Soviet émigrés would be great. The US Government would, in a war with the USSR, have a critical need for thousands of these

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émigrés as propaganda personnel, interrogation teams, and sabotage and espionage operations and administrative personnel.”⁸ (S)

Hillenkoetter recommended that “there will be no organized utilization by the US Government of large groups or the mass of Soviet emigres.” He did, however, advise that the State Department screen all refugees from the Soviet orbit and prepare a master index of names, residences, and occupations. This screening, Hillenkoetter noted, “must include the object of isolating persons who are suitable for direct use in intelligence purposes, as distinct from merely furnishing miscellaneous information.”⁹ (S)

Project ICON (U)

As early as March 1948, Hillenkoetter told James Forrestal, the secretary of defense, that he preferred to recruit competent individuals within the Soviet Union or former Russian intelligence officers as agents.¹⁰ Only days after Hillenkoetter made this statement, he assigned responsibility of investigating the operational utilization of emigre groups to the Office of Special Operations.¹¹(S)

As a result of SANACC 395, CIA undertook a study of the various émigré groups in Europe asking for American support to fight Communism. By mid-1948, Zsolt Aradi,

⁸DCI to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, “Utilization of the Mass of Soviet Refugees,” 19 April 1948, ER-428, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 498, Folder 9, CIA ARC. (S)

⁹Ibid. (S)

¹⁰DCI to Secretary of Defense, “Exploitation of Anti-Communist Underground Groups in Eastern Europe,” 25 March 1948, OSO TS-658, (S), WASH-CIA-AD-75. This document has not been located and information cited here is derived from an index card in CIA History Staff files. (S)

¹¹ADSO to Chief, Operations, “Possible Utilization of Soviet Refugees,” 30 March 1948, (C), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 13, CIA ARC. This same document is found in DO Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (C)

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however, had departed Munich for the United States and [redacted] had transferred to a new assignment in Berlin. A fresh CIA case officer, [redacted] newly assigned to Munich, was assigned the job of assessing the Ukrainians and other Eastern European groups under Project ICON.¹² (S)

In his 9 April 1948 report, [redacted] surveyed the existing network of underground groups in 12 Eastern and Southeastern European countries under Soviet domination. [redacted] called for Project ICON to "support, by clandestine means, ...resistance and underground groups in Soviet-dominated Europe in their opposition to Communism." He looked at the current situation, noting that traditional political groups and underground resistance groups had all but been eradicated by the Soviets in Eastern Europe. The need for security and control was essential in order for Project ICON to achieve any measure of success. "Good security," [redacted] wrote, "is therefore the first prerequisite to the utilization of any group. Individuals and leaders of groups selected to implement Plan ICON will be chosen on the basis of their previously demonstrated ability to conduct secure operations."¹³ (S)

The project called for three phases leading to the employment of the resistance groups for "direct action" against the Soviets. The first or "initial" phase called for identifying those individuals and small groups that were already established. The

¹² [redacted] joined CIG in March 1947 after receiving a BA in German and Political Science at Yale University. An Army veteran of the Mediterranean Theater, [redacted] served briefly in CIC in mid-1945 along the Austrian-German border. He served with OSO in Vienna, Heidelberg, and Munich from 1947 until 1950 when he returned to Washington. He later returned to West Germany and also served [redacted]. He retired in 1970 at the age of 47 after cutbacks in the Deputy Directorate of Plans (DDP) reduced personnel strength. [redacted]

¹³"Plan ICON" Report, 9 April 1948, OSOTS-743, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] Box 5, Folder 88, CIA ARC. [redacted] also discusses his work on Project ICON report in his 1996 memoirs and addendum. These documents are located at the CIA History Staff. (S)

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“implementation” phase would encourage those same groups to oppose the communist regimes while inspiring the formation of new resistance organizations. Finally, the “ultimate” phase would use the “tested underground groups for direct action against Communist-dominated regimes, Communist Parties, and agencies of the USSR in Eastern Europe.”¹⁴ (S)

A Fresh Look at the Ukrainians (U)

After completing his initial survey, [redacted] embarked on a larger study to update Zsolt Aradi's earlier December 1946 report on the Ukrainian nationalists.¹⁵ Drawing on the files of the Army Counter Intelligence Corps in Munich and CIA's own records, [redacted] evaluated the Bandera and Melnik factions of the OUN, the UHVR/ZPUHVR, and the Ukrainian National Republic (an older emigre group in western Europe) to determine which organizations met the following criteria:

- a. The political platform and political or military leaders of the organization are demonstrably acceptable to a sizable section of anti-Soviet Ukrainians at home and in the emigration.
- b. The political and ideological program of the group is one which the United States would not be embarrassed to support.
- c. The group has the recognition or approval of some resistance leaders in the Ukraine and a communication channel to those leaders.

¹⁴Ibid. (S)

¹⁵Chief of Station, Karlsruhe (signed by James Critchfield and [redacted] to Chief, FBM, “Project ICON: Postwar Ukrainian Exile Organizations in Western Europe,” 20 October 1948, MGM-A-793, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] Box 1, Folder 5, CIA ARC. This report is hereafter cited as Project ICON/Ukraine Report. (S)

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d. The support of the groups by the United States could feasibly remain clandestine and work to the detriment of the present Russian government and its military potential.¹⁶ (S)

To provide him with some firsthand accounts of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, [] reestablished contact with Ivan Hrinioch in mid-1948. [] held ten interviews with ZPUHVR's clerical first vice president and with Michael Korzan, an early member of the OUN and a member of the Austrian branch of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), for Project ICON.¹⁷ Hrinioch, whom [] had not contacted since 1947, had been picked up as a source by both CIC Special Agent Camille S. Hajdu and by the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), two different Army organizations in Munich.¹⁸ Capt. Zoltan Havas of MIS, in the meantime, had already embarked on discussions with Hrinioch about expanding the ZPUHVR's courier networks between Germany and UPA operatives in the Ukraine.¹⁹ Interestingly, Havas used Dr. Fritz Arlt, a former SS officer, as his cutout to Hrinioch.²⁰ (S)

¹⁶Ibid., p. 2. (S)

¹⁷Ibid., p. 1; Dr. Hrinioch is cited directly in the report while Korzan is referred to as CAPELIN. (S)

¹⁸A description of [] contact with Hrinioch is contained in COS, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "Project ANDROGEN Memo No. 1: The Genesis through 20 January 1949," 16 March 1949, MGM-A-1023, (S), in DO Records, [] Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. This memo discusses how Hrinioch proved difficult to work with and explains the delays that the CIA experienced with ZPUHVR. See also Project ICON/Ukraine Report, pp. 19-21. (S)

¹⁹Special Agent Hajdu assumed control of Hrinioch immediately after [] dropped him in 1947. By mid-1948, however, the Counter Intelligence Corps had reduced its contacts with Eastern European dissident groups in West Germany. By February 1949, CIC dropped the Ukrainian priest from its list of active informants. See COS, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "Project ANDROGEN Memo No. 1: The Genesis through 20 January 1949," 16 March 1949, MGM-A-1023, (S), in DO Records, [] Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. Talks between Hrinioch and Capt. Havas, which started in August 1948, are discussed in Cable, Munich to SO, Karlsruhe, 13 January 1949, Munich 265, IN 21449, (S), in DO Records, [] Box 4, Folder 23, CIA ARC. Ironically, [] OSO's Executive Officer, told the Personnel Division in September 1947 that "it has been learned from the US Constabulary that Captain Havas (first name unknown) is being relieved from assignment and sent home. The Constabulary does not consider him qualified for intelligence activities, and, therefore, Heidelberg has

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Like Aradi two years earlier, [] decidedly favored the ZPUHVR. He believed that the Foreign Representation had the support of both Ukrainians at home and in western Germany. According to [] the ZPUHVR's leaders practiced good security measures, and they also "demonstrated that they are not interested in personal gain or profit." [] was also impressed that "ZPUHVR has kept itself morally and politically uncommitted and uncompromised over a period of three years."²¹ (S)

CIA Takes on the ZPUHVR (U)

[] support for the ZPUHVR coincided with a new, and major, step in US intelligence efforts aimed at the Soviet Union. Unlike Aradi's and Holtsman's earlier

informed this office that Havas's employment by us would create a poor impression." [], Executive Officer, Special Operations, Memorandum to Chief, Personnel Division, "Captain Havas," 8 September 1947, (C), in DO Records, [] Box 1, Folder 5, CIA ARC. For another report on Havas, see Cable, Heidelberg to Washington, 8 October 1947, Heidelberg 1867, IN 25139, (S), in DO Records, [] Box 9, Folder 220, CIA ARC. Havas, born in Czechoslovakia in 1920, came to the United States in 1937 and joined the US Army in 1942. He served in the Signal Corps and with Army intelligence following his commission as an officer in 1943. Havas commanded a MIS unit in Germany and worked closely with CIG and CIA in 1947 and 1949; both times, he was considered for employment. The Agency rejected his application in 1949 based on questions regarding his character, integrity, and political loyalty. The Army later released him in 1954 following allegations of black market activities. Havas worked for the *New York Times* in Paris where he was briefly in contact [] . For further details, see Zoltan Havas, [] , DO Records. (S)

²⁰Born in 1912, Fritz Arlt joined the Nazi party in 1932 and served in numerous positions before the war. He served briefly in the *Wehrmacht* in 1939 and later in the *Waffen SS* where he rose to the rank of *Obersturmbannfuhrer*. He reportedly handled liaison between the RSHA and Ukrainian and Vlasov Army representatives. After the war, Arlt worked as an informant for CIC and later served as a member of the Gehlen Organization. The US Army apparently maintained its contact with Arlt until the late 1960s, and his name came up in conjunction with the Heinz Felfe investigations of the KGB's penetration of the BND. For further details, see Fritz Arlt, [] , DO Records. (S)

²¹Project ICON/Austria Report, pp. 14-15. (S)

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efforts, which met only halfhearted approval in Washington, CIA headquarters now eagerly sought to work with the Ukrainians in Munich. Richard Helms, chief of Foreign Branch M, cabled Munich on 3 December 1948 to ask Hrinoich and ZPUHVR if the Ukrainians could provide volunteers for courier missions under American control. The CIA now wanted to work with the Ukrainians against the Soviets, as opposed to merely collecting information on the émigré groups. "Best approach these groups . . .," Helms advised, "probably stating our aim as rendering assistance [to] dissidents rather than purely intelligence purposes."²² (S)

Following Helms's directive, [redacted] convinced both Hrinioch and Mykola Lebed in January 1949 that the United States now planned to cooperate with the ZPUHVR to send couriers (the so-called APOSTLES) to the Ukraine. By early February, [redacted] cabled Washington with the news that "our relations with ZPUHVR have greatly accelerated at our initiative. Both Havas and CAPARISON [Hrinoich] agree to turn complete operational allegiance of ZPUHVR over to MOB [Munich Operations Base]." [redacted] also informed Headquarters about Ukrainian requests for support and other details concerning the commencement of operations.²³ (S)

[redacted] gathered as much information as he could about the ZPUHVR's periodic, but generally unsuccessful, courier missions that had attracted some open press reporting since 1946.²⁴ By late March 1949, [redacted] submitted a developmental plan for Project

²²Cable, SO to Munich, Karlsruhe, 3 December 1948, Washington 5815, OUT 72439, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 4, Folder 23, CIA ARC. (S)

²³Cable, Munich to SO, Karlsruhe, 2 February 1949, Munich 292, IN 22867, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], DO Records, CIA ARC. (S)

²⁴A report concerning the arrival of the Apostles is found in COS, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "Project ANDROGEN Memo No. 2: How the APOSTLES Came to Germany," 16 March 1949, MGM-A-1024, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. See also Acting Chief, MOB to Chief, FBM, "Personal Record of APOSTLES 1 and 2 (Ops)," 3 May 1949, MGM-A-1136, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 5, CIA ARC. (S)

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ANDROGEN that called for the "accumulation of information on the status of the Ukrainian underground movement for use as a frame of reference in ascertaining the various ways in which the existence of this movement could have bearing on the course of an open conflict between the United States and the USSR." The American case officer noted that the ZPUHVR activities were not only illegal under US military government regulations, but that its key figures also had no legal status in Germany. [redacted] wrote, "if the courier operation fails and the personnel is simply dropped, no disposal costs are envisaged." He added, however, that the "evacuation of CAPARISON [Hrinoich], ANTLER [Lebed], and ACROBAT [Lopatinsky] and their four dependents from Western Germany may be deemed advisable at a later date whether the initial attempt to develop this project as a whole is successful or not."²⁵ (S)

[redacted] agreed that CIA's base in Munich would provide a number of services for the Ukrainians, including housing and training for the APOSTLES. The Agency likewise would replace the funds previously confiscated by the German border police from the Ukrainian couriers when they entered the country. Perhaps most importantly, [redacted] agreed that "our organization will endeavor to shorten the distance to be traversed on foot by the APOSTLES between Munich and their destination."²⁶ After reviewing previous missions (only one courier had arrived in Ukraine from Germany since 1946), [redacted]

²⁵COS, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "ANDROGEN Project," 31 March 1949, MGM-A-1059, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. Approval of this project with stipulations by headquarters is found in Chief, FBM to Chief of Station, Karlsruhe "Project ANDROGEN," 25 April 1949, MGK-W-1952, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. (S)

²⁶Ibid. (S)

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admitted, "transporting the APOSTLES and several radios by air to be dropped by parachute offers the only solution with good possibilities of success."²⁷ (S)

In the first of many demands, the ZPUHVR wanted the CIA to publicize its resistance efforts as well as to permit several of its leaders, including Hrinoich and Lebed, to address Ukrainian groups in the United States and Canada. The Ukrainian organization even asked that CIA assist the ZPUHVR to promote its activities outside of Germany.²⁸ (S)

Foreign Branch M's Richard Helms and Harry Rositzke, chief of Foreign Branch S, submitted a proposal to Col. Robert A. Schow, the new Assistant Director for Special Operations, on 26 July 1949 seeking approval to exploit the Ukrainian resistance movement within the Soviet Union. Schow approved the project the same day.²⁹ At the same time, the Ukrainian project was redesignated as Project CARTEL (it had been known as ANDROGEN), utilizing the same personnel. In addition to providing radio and cipher training to the Ukrainians, unmarked American aircraft would transport the

²⁷COS Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "Project ANDROGEN Memo No. 1: The Genesis through 20 January 1949," 16 March 1949, MGM-A-1023, (S), in DO Records, [] , Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. Donald G. Huefner at FBM in Washington complimented [] and said that "your progress report on Project ANDROGEN is regarded here as excellent and exactly the type of report we like to receive on such operations. Prior to the receipt of this memorandum communications on this project have been almost entirely confined to cable traffic, and although we have been informed of developments as they occurred, cables do not indicate the time and effort in such negotiations." Huefner also noted the difficulties in working with ZPUHVR and said, "it is obvious that in order to obtain the maximum amount of cooperation from such groups as the UHVR and to minimize the delays such as encountered in your dealings with CAPARISON, we must be prepared to grant assistance to them which is not primarily associated with intelligence." Chief, FBM to COS, Karlsruhe, "Project ANDROGEN," 11 April 1949, MGK-W-1879, (S), in DO Records, [] , Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. (S)

²⁸Ibid. (S)

²⁹Chief, FBM and Chief, FBS to ADSO via COPS, "Proposed Air Dispatch of Androgen Agents into the USSR," 26 July 1949, (S), in DO Records, [] , Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. (S)

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Ukrainians and their equipment. The American case officer, known simply as "Mister H" to the Ukrainians, also provided funds to the bankrupt ZPUHVR.³⁰ (S)

Black Missions (U)

The first CIA-sponsored airdrop into the USSR took place in September 1949 when two Ukrainians landed near Lvov. This mission, coordinated and handled by [redacted], sought to establish contact with the UHVR/UPA in the Ukraine.³¹ While this mission failed because the Soviets quickly rounded up the agents, [redacted]'s operation sparked considerable interest at Headquarters. The Agency moved to expand its exploitation of the ZPUHVR as well as with other émigré groups in Germany.³² By 1950, the CIA engaged in joint talks with the British to launch operations into Ukraine;

³⁰COS, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "CARTEL," 24 June 1949, MGM-A-1312, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. (S)

³¹Chief of Station, Karlsruhe (signed by [redacted] to Chief, FBM, "Project CARTEL: Operational Memorandum No. 8. A Synopsis of the HIDER-CARTEL Plane Flight," 16 September 1949, MGM-A-1584, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. Headquarters response to [redacted] report is found in Chief, FDM to Chief of Station, "CARTEL Project," 10 October 1949, MGK-W-3164, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. The various CIA-Ukrainian missions are covered extensively in [redacted]

³²The growth in CIA's interest in Ukrainian operations can be seen in the following documents: Schow to Wisner, "Exploitation of Ukrainian Nationalist Resistance Organization," 22 December 1949, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC; J. Bryan III to Chief, Programs and Planning Division, OPC, "Use of Ukrainian Partisan Partisan [sic] Movement Against USSR," 25 January 1950, (S); undated, signed, "Agreement for Joint OSO/OPC Exploitation of ZPUHVR/UHVR;" undated, unsigned, "Memorandum of Understanding between OPC and OSO Concerning the Joint Exploitation of the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation (ZPUHVR) and the Supreme Council (UHVR);" Project Outline Clearance Sheet, AERODYNAMIC-PBCRUET, 15 December 1950; and "Summary Joint OSO/OPC Report on the Ukrainian Resistance Movement, 12 December 1950" with cover sheet, Schow and Wisner to DCI, "Joint OSO/OPC Report on the Ukrainian Resistance Movement, 4

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the Americans, however, continued to support the ZPUHVR while the British promoted Bandera's OUN.³³ (S)

The Ukrainian airdrops also formed the basis for expanded CIA illegal border crossings into the Soviet Union by Foreign Division S, which assumed responsibility for all OSO operations behind the Iron Curtain in February 1950. The bulk of these missions were launched from Munich in a project called REDSOX. These operations took agents to Belorussia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and other areas of the Soviet Union. But it was a project marked by tragedy. According to one CIA official in 1957, "the path of experience in attempts at the legalization of black infiltrated bodies into the USSR has been strewn with disaster." At least 75 percent of the 85 CIA agents dispatched under REDSOX disappeared from sight and failed in their missions. A survey of these agents reveals that most of these men had recently deserted from the Soviet Army or had collaborated with the Nazis during the war.³⁴ (S)

January 1951, all documents located in DO Records, [] [] Box 1, Folder 1, CIA ARC. (S)

³³For an example of US-British discussions and agreements about Ukrainian operations, see Wyman to Deputy Director, Plans, "Ukrainian Position Paper," 23 April 1951, (S); Chief, [] [] to Chief, FDW, "CIA/State Department Talks with SIS/Foreign Office in London Beginning Monday, April 23, 1951," 4 May 1951, WELA-5084, (S), both documents in DO Records, [] [] Box 1, Folder 1, CIA ARC. Further accounts of the Anglo-American talks about support for Ukrainian and other Eastern European groups are found in [] []

³⁴For a more complete history of CIA's REDSOX operations. [] []

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[] . For another perspective, see "Survey of Illegal Border Operations into Czechoslovakia and Poland from 1948 through 1955," (S), in DO Records, [] [] , Box 1, Folder 2, CIA ARC. For "open source" discussions of CIA operations behind the Iron Curtain, see Peer de Silva, *Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence* (New York: Times Books,

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Going to America (U)

After 1953, the CIA no longer supported aerial missions into the Ukraine, but the Agency's operational relationship with the Ukrainians remained not only the first such activity, but one of its most resilient. Even before the missions were abandoned, the Agency brought Mykola Lebed to the United States in 1949 where he became the president of the Prologue Research Corporation, a CIA proprietary company, three years later. Prologue (supported by the Agency in a number of projects called AERODYNAMIC, QRDYNAMIC, and QRPLUMB) was a Ukrainian publishing and distribution corporation with affiliates in Munich, London, and Paris. It published *Suchanist*, a Ukrainian-language monthly political-literary magazine, and other material for dissemination in Ukraine.³⁵ The Agency regarded this activity as one of its best projects with the emigres and it took on a larger role as the CIA abandoned efforts to infiltrate agents into the Ukraine. The costs were relatively minor ([redacted] in 1967) and

1978), pp. 55-57; John Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II* (New York: William Morrow, 1986), pp. 30-60; and Harry Rositzke, *The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action* (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977), pp. 18-38. (S)

³⁵Chief, Political and Psychological Staff, [redacted], to Deputy Director for Operations, "Potential Threat of Exposure to Major Covert Action Instrumentality," with attachment, "Approval-FY-86 Operational Activity-QRPLUMB," 5 December 1985, (S), in Lebed, [redacted] DO Records. (S)

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the Agency continued to support it until September 1990 when it ended "after 38 years of successful CA operations."³⁶ (S)

When he submitted his proposal for Project ANDROGEN in March 1949, [redacted] envisioned the possibility that the United States might have to evacuate the chief Ukrainian operators from Munich.³⁷ Only two months later, Lebed (using the alias of Roman Turan) with his wife and daughter began processing for immigration to the United States under the provisions of the 1948 Displaced Persons Act. Munich told Washington in a cable on 18 May that "subject's face and true name are well known in Germany, Poland and Western Russia as result of widely advertised police and [Russian] I.S. search for subject in those lands." Because of his blown cover in Europe, his poverty (Lebed relied upon a "ZPUHVR monthly handout"), and the fact that his presence in Germany

³⁶Lebed served as president of Prologue from 1952 until his retirement in 1979. He then remained as a part-time consultant for the organization. [redacted], Memorandum for the Record, "Justice Department's Interest in QRPLUMB/2," 31 October 1991, (S). The cost of CIA support is found in Chief, SB to CIA Legislative Counsel, 11 April 1967, (S), both documents in Lebed, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

³⁷COS, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "Androgen Project," 31 March 1949, MGM-A-1059, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 4, Folder 22, CIA ARC. Special Agent Hajdu had already arranged for the US Army's secret airlift of Lebed and his family from Rome to Munich in December 1947 because of threats to Lebed's life by the Soviets. Hrinoich had also asked that Lebed join him in Munich. For more details on Lebed's move to Germany, see Region IV, 970th CIC Detachment, Lt. Col. Ellington D. Golden to Commanding Officer, 970th CIC Detachment, "Lebed, Nikolaus and Family," 18 November 1947, (C), enclosing Special Agent Camille S. Hajdu, Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, "Lebed, Nikolaus and Family," 17 November 1947, (C); Headquarters, 970th CIC Detachment, Maj. Earl A. Browning, Jr., to Commanding Officer, Region IV, 970th CIC Detachment, "Lebed, Nikolaus and Family," 24 November 1947, (U); and Region IV, 970th CIC Detachment, Lt. Col. Golden to Commanding Officer, 970th CIC Detachment, "Move of Nikolas Lebed and Family from Rome, Italy to Munich, US Zone of Germany," 18 December 1947, (C), enclosing Hajdu, Memorandum for the Officer in Charge, "Move of Nikolas Lebed and Family from Rome, Italy to Munich, US Zone of Germany," 18

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was not essential to the airdrop mission, Munich base recommended that he move to the United States under an alias. "Subject does not dare use true name for immigration purpose [because he] has had to go into complete hiding several times in Germany because of threats on life."³⁸ (S)

Even at this point, knowingly using a false identity during immigration posed legal issues for the Agency and Lebed himself. "Subject loath to perjure self and face deportation after arrival as result of passing false info to the US Govt. and therefore wants our sanction for his immigration under alias," [redacted] told his superiors. The Agency in Munich did not anticipate any problems with the background checks being done by the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps in Bavaria, but it was concerned about immigration officials in the United States.³⁹ Headquarters, in the meantime, wanted complete personal details on Lebed, but allowed the Ukrainian's immigration to proceed.⁴⁰ (S)

Shortly after Munich's initial cable to Washington, Navy Capt. Clarence L. Winecoff, newly appointed CIA Executive, wrote Mr. W.W. Wiggins, CIA's point of contact at the Immigration and Naturalization Service, in June 1949 to inform him about

December 1947, (C). All documents are found in Mykola Lebed, Dossier C 8043982WJ, IRR, INSCOM. (C)

³⁸Cable, FBM to SO, 18 May 1949, Munich 472, IN 32012, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] Box 4, Folder 23, CIA ARC. For a discussion on the threats to Lebed's life and why the Army moved him from Italy to Germany, see [redacted] *The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944-1948*, pp. 54-55. (S)

³⁹Ibid. The CIC in Germany conducted an investigation of "Roman Turan" prior to Lebed's immigration to the US as a displaced person. Results of this investigation are found in Lebed, Dossier C 8043982WJ, IRR, INSCOM. (C)

⁴⁰Cable, SO to FBM, 26 May 1949, Washington 4214, OUT 82118, (S), 26 May 1949, in DO Records, [redacted] Box 4, Folder 23, CIA ARC. (S)

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the Agency's plans for the Ukrainian resistance leader. Winecoff, in turn, told the INS that Lebed, using the name of Roman Turan, had submitted paperwork for his departure from Germany.⁴¹ Winecoff advised that, "for some time, one Mykola Lebed has been rendering valuable assistance to this Agency in Europe." He added, "the reasons for using the name Turan are substantial." Repeating much of the same information as in the Munich cable, Winecoff admitted that Lebed "possesses rather extensive knowledge of certain CIA operations and is familiar with certain groups with which we are in contact. Consequently, for his own personal safety and for the security of our operations, it is essential that he not be picked up [by] any police authorities." In the margin of the document, Winecoff added that since Lebed had already been using the alias "prior to entry, his entry under that name would be legal."⁴² (S)

The Immigration and Naturalization Service agreed to the CIA's request in July and Headquarters told the German Station that "full info on CARTEL 2 given immigration authorities here and no objection their part to use alias." Headquarters also stated that Lebed should maintain his cover story and that "our action best protection [against] fraudulent entry charge and no difficulty anticipated on resumption [of] true identity upon CARTEL 2 entry [into the] States."⁴³ On 16 September, Munich notified Washington that Lebed had completed his immigration processing under his alias. Lebed

⁴¹In addition to his alias of Roman Turan, Lebed also had CIA cryptonyms of ANTLER, CAPARISON 2, and CARTEL 2 during this same time period. (S)

⁴²Winecoff to Wiggins, 20 June 1949, (S), in Lebed, [redacted] [redacted], DO Records. (S)

⁴³Cable, SO to Munich, 19 July 1949, Washington 6898, OUT 85455, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] [redacted], Box 4, Folder 23, CIA ARC. (S)

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expressed his desire to remain in touch with the Agency upon his arrival at his uncle's residence in Brooklyn.⁴⁴ Lebed sailed from Bremerhaven on the USS *General Howze*, a DP transport ship, on 25 September and arrived in New York in early October.⁴⁵ (S)

No Better Than OUN Leader Stephen Bandera (U)

After settling in New York, Lebed maintained a low profile but resumed the use of his real name. The Agency quickly reestablished ties with Lebed and conducted extensive debriefings about Ukrainian resistance activities and the relationships between the UHVR and the different Ukrainian émigré groups, particularly Bandera's OUN.⁴⁶ At the end of November 1949, Helms asked the Office of General Counsel to check with US immigration officials about Lebed's entry status and to make sure that he could use his own name.⁴⁷ The INS rejected Lebed's petition for permanent residence, and he was informed that he needed to obtain legal counsel in order to revert to his real name. The

⁴⁴Cable, Munich to SO, 16 September 1949, Munich 723, IN 43248, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 4, Folder 23, CIA ARC. (S)

⁴⁵Cable, SO to Munich, 29 September 1949, Washington 8879, OUT 90422, (S), and Cable, Munich to SO, 30 September 1949, Munich 751, IN 44572, (S), in DO Records, [redacted] CIA ARC. (S)

⁴⁶Cable, SO to Munich, 29 September 1949, Washington 8879, OUT 90422, (S); Cable, Munich to SO, 7 October 1949, Munich 764, IN 45355, (S); Cable, SO to Munich, 7 November 1949, Washington 3146, OUT 92994, (S), all in DO Records, [redacted], Box 4, Folder 23. See also [redacted] to Chief, FBM, "CARTEL 2 Debriefing Report, 16 December 1949, (S), and Chief, FDM to COS, Karlsruhe, "Transmittal of CARTEL 2 Debriefing Report," 23 December 1949, MGK-W-3676, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 1, CIA ARC. (S)

⁴⁷Chief, FDM to Office of the General Counsel, "Mikola Lebed @ Roman Turan," 23 November 1949, (S), in Lebed, [redacted] DO Records. (S)

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Central Intelligence Agency subsequently asked the INS at the end of January 1950 to “take such action as may be deemed appropriate in order that subject can file his first papers under his true name.”⁴⁸ (S)

Lebed’s arrival in New York did not go unnoticed within the large Ukrainian émigré community. He founded the Association of Friends of the Ukrainian Liberation Struggle, but soon encountered jealousies in New York. In November 1950, a Peter Jablon (also known as Peter Jary) told the FBI that he considered Lebed a “bandit” who had committed many assassinations. Lebed, in Jablon’s words, was “no better than OUN leader Stephen Bandera.” A New York-based special agent from the FBI subsequently interviewed Lebed about these allegations in early 1951. Lebed acknowledged that he had been active in Ukrainian groups in America and that he was currently working on a book about the Ukrainian resistance movement. Lebed held up his anticommunist credentials at the same time as he proclaimed Jablon as a “strange man” with numerous personality inconsistencies.⁴⁹ (S)

Word that Lebed’s arrival in America did not sit well among various immigrant factions in New York filtered back to the Washington bureaucracy. In 1951, the Agency undertook a research project to ascertain Lebed’s role in the 1934 assassination of Bronislaw Pieracki, the Polish Minister of Interior. Because of his murder conviction in Poland, Lebed now faced deportation from the United States. On 1 June 1951, [] []

⁴⁸ [] [] , Acting Executive, to Wiggins, “Mikola Lebed,” 31 January 1950, SA-7320118, (S), in Lebed, [] [] DO Records. (S)

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☐ ☐ acting chief of Foreign Division S, told CIA's Staff C that the FBI had just notified him that the INS "is contemplating initiating an investigation looking toward developing sufficient evidence to institute deportation proceedings." ☐ ☐ objected to this action:

...since the subject is known to us for his liberal and democratic political views and for his work as the legitimate Foreign Minister of the clandestine anti-Soviet government in the Ukraine, it is the opinion of FDS that no just grounds exist for his deportation which would outweigh the serious political repercussions subsequent to his deportation among the anti-Soviet emigration all over the world.⁵⁰ (S)

The Immigration and Naturalization Service soon informed the CIA about the case it planned against Lebed. The charges, as stated in 1951, remain controversial today and merit full citation:

For over a year several Ukrainian informants have mentioned the presence in this country of one MYKOLA LEBED. They all believed he had arrived here as a Displaced Person under an assumed name, and since his arrival, has been very active in Ukrainian Nationalistic activities, speaking on numerous occasions in different cities in the Eastern part of the United States. Lebed was well known in Ukrainian circles in Europe for years as one of the most important Bandera terrorists. He is known as one of the group of Bandera men that assassinated Bronislaw Pieracki, the Polish Minister of Interior during 1934. Lebed and his associates were tried and sentenced to death in January, 1936. However, it is believed that the death sentence was later commuted to a prison term. Lebed was in jail in Poland until the Germans overran that country, when he was either

⁴⁹FBI Report, "Mikola Lebed," 2 February 1951, NY File No. 105-1504, (S), in Lebed, ☐ ☐ DO Records. (S)

⁵⁰Acting Chief, FDS to STC, "Mykola Lebed," 1 June 1951, (S) in Lebed, ☐ ☐ DO Records. (S)

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released or escaped from jail in the confusion of a German air raid. Lebed then rejoined the Bandera group and began working for the Germans in organizing Ukrainian groups to aid the Germans in fighting the Russians. These Ukrainian groups are reported as having been trained in a Gestapo school later furnished with arms and equipment and worked with German Storm Troopers, suppressing local resistance, to the Germans, following the withdrawal of the Russian Army. Wholesale murders of Ukrainians, Polish and Jews usually took place. In all these actions, Lebed was one of the most important leaders. During the German occupation of Ukraine, Lebed and his terroristic group were known as 'Special Defense Service.' Their activities were directed by the Gestapo.⁵¹ (S)

Four months later, Col. Sheffield Edwards, CIA's Security Officer, told Mr. Wiggins at the INS that "we are not in possession of any information indicating that he [Lebed] is engaged in any activities prejudicial to the interests of the United States." Based on Lebed's own accounts, Col. Edwards rejected allegations that Lebed participated in the Pieracki assassination. The Agency even reviewed contemporary Polish newspaper accounts of the trial at the New York Public Library and concluded that the 1935-36 trial had been tainted for political reasons. Likewise, it also discounted the labeling of the OUN as "terrorist" because this designation had been employed by the Soviets as well as other groups with an anti-OUN bent. Similarly, CIA believed that many of the sources of the allegations against Lebed were "questionable and probably biased."⁵² (S)

⁵¹Acting Assistant Commissioner, Enforcement Division, Immigration and Naturalization Service, James E. Riley to the DCI, 7 June 1951, SA-7320118, (S), in Lebed, [] DO Records. (S)

⁵²Sheffield Edwards to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, ATTN: W.W. Wiggins, "Mykola Lebed, aka: Roman Turan," 3 October 1951, JL-668, (S), in Lebed, [] DO Records. **Report on the Assassination of Minister Pieracki** with information on the 1935-36 trial of OUN conspirators (including Bandera and Lebed) derived from the Polish newspaper *Kurier Warszawski* is found in Lebed, [] DO Records. (S)

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As far as Lebed's wartime activities were concerned, the Agency believed that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army had "fought with equal zeal against both the Nazis and the Bolsheviks." The CIA also cited a warrant issued by the Gestapo in October 1941 for Lebed's arrest as proof of his anti-Nazi activities. The Agency argued that Lebed's role as Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation, an organization founded in 1944, placed him in an "influential position to render unique service to the United States and to this Agency in the furtherance of its intelligence mission."⁵³ (S)

Despite these assurances, the Immigration and Naturalization Service remained doubtful about the Ukrainian. While the Service held no deportation hearings in 1951, the Agency fretted that the INS might refuse to allow Lebed to reenter the United States in the event that he traveled overseas for operational purposes. Lebed had already returned once to Germany in 1950 for a short visit and planned to do so again in the near future.⁵⁴ To preclude any problems concerning his status in the United States, CIA again examined Lebed's past.⁵⁵ (S)

⁵³Ibid. (S)

⁵⁴An Affidavit of Identity in lieu of a passport, issued in Washington, D.C., on 17 April 1950 and a pass for the Western Zone is included in Lebed, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

⁵⁵ADPC to DCI, "Mykola Lebed," 28 March 1952, with attachments, (S) in Lebed, [redacted] DO Records. A copy of the 8 April 1952 Questionnaire with Lebed's 18 May 1952 answers is located in Lebed, [redacted], DO Records. This document does not appear to have been translated from Ukrainian to English until 22 January 1986. The English-version translation is also located in Lebed's records. The depth of this 1952 background investigation appears shallow as most of the phrases employed by CIA officials to defend Lebed against the INS were simply adopted from previous CIA correspondence about him. For another report about Lebed, see Chief, Contact Division, O/O to ADSO, "Information Concerning Anti-Soviet Ukrainian Resistance," 13 March 1951, (S), in Lebed, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

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Inestimable Value (U)

The CIA concluded that Lebed's activities on the behalf of American intelligence were of such "inestimable value" that the Agency could ill afford to lose him as an asset. Allen W. Dulles, then the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, told the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization on 5 May 1952 that the Agency planned to sponsor Lebed in the United States under Section 8 of the CIA Act of 1949. This act, discussed later in greater detail, permitted the DCI, with the approval of the INS Commissioner and the US Attorney General, to admit up to 100 aliens per year for national security reasons regardless of their eligibility under normal immigration regulations. Dulles furthermore requested that Lebed's entry date under Section 8 be made retroactive to his initial arrival in the fall of 1949.⁵⁶ (S)

Through the use of this act, the CIA prevented Lebed's deportation. Tireless in his efforts on behalf of Ukrainian nationalism, Lebed remained one of the Agency's oldest contacts until his death in 1998.⁵⁷ The CIA's actions in 1949 and again in 1952,

⁵⁶DDCI to Argyle R. Mackey, Commissioner for Immigration and Naturalization, "Mykola Lebed," 5 May 1952, (S), in Lebed, L J DO Records. (S)

⁵⁷A 1957 Request for Investigation and Approval shows that Lebed, as a covert associate for Project AERODYNAMIC, performed the following tasks: "Principal agent in CIA exploitation of AECASSOWARY 1 [this refers to Hrinoich]; for CE, PP, and FI purposes. To be used in the United States, Western Europe, Latin America, and any areas where agent's emigre group can be profitably exploited. Activities include: Newspaper support; clandestine radio; leaflet campaign; poison pen letters; sending of letters and printed matter to the Soviet Union; recruitment, training dispatch, and interrogation of agent playback operations against the Soviets; doubling of

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however, have not stilled nagging suspicions about Lebed, and he remains a controversial figure to this day.⁵⁸ (S)

A Curious Anomaly (U)

couriers; preparation, receipt, and sending of messages via S/W and W/T to and from the USSR." See Request for Investigation and Approval, 21 June 1957, (S), in Lebed, [redacted], DO Records. As a part of this investigation, Lebed underwent polygraph testing. The examiner noted that Lebed refused to undergo testing in April 1951 but consented six years later. He found Lebed "to be frank and truthful in his statements and did not seem to be hiding or attempting to give misinformation on any specific question asked." Lebed, however, "appeared to more concerned about his past association with the incident of the assassination of the Polish Minister than his work and the alleged collaboration with the Nazis during World War II." The examiner believed that Lebed told "the truth, but that he still has some pertinent information which may be obtained by further debriefing." Interrogation Research Branch to Chief, Security Support Division, "S.F. #40828," 13 April 1957, (S), in Lebed, [redacted], DO Records: (S)

⁵⁸Lebed was one of 12 individuals investigated by the General Accounting Office in its 1985 Report (listed as "Subject D"). This report and the Lebed's subsequent identification drew media attention, including the *Village Voice* and *The New York Times*. For an example of this coverage, see Ralph Blumenthal, "CIA Accused of Aid to '30's Terrorist," *The New York Times*, 5 February 1986, p. B-5. In October 1991, the Office of Special Investigations informed the CIA that it planned to conduct inquiries with foreign governments about Lebed's wartime role. OSI had previously conducted an interview with Lebed six years earlier. Eli M. Rosenbaum, Principal Deputy Director, OSI, to Office of General Counsel, 4 October 1991, OGC 91-05243, and [redacted], Memorandum for the Record, "Interrogation of QRPLUMB/2," 16 October 1985, (S), both in Lebed, [redacted], DO Records. Roman Kupchinsky, president of Prologue, in turn, demanded that both the CIA and the GAO apologize to Lebed. See Roman Kupchinsky, "GAO Report on War Criminals Entering the US," 16 July 1985, in Lebed, [redacted], DO Records. Kupchinsky believed that the Soviets were behind many of the accusations leveled against Ukrainian nationalists. See Roman Kupchinsky, "Nazi War Criminals: The Role of Soviet Disinformation," in Boshyk, ed., *Ukraine During World War II: History and Its Aftermath*, pp. 137-144. The CIA's concerns about exposing Lebed and his connection to the Agency are found in [redacted], Chief, Political and Psychological Staff, Memorandum to DDO, "Department of Justice Investigation of QRPLUMB/2," 6 January 1986, (S), in Myroslav Prokop, [redacted], DO Records. Lebed continues to draw public interest as seen in Ralph Blumenthal, "CIA is Planning to Unlock Many Long-Secret Nazi Files," *The New York Times*, 10 September 1992, p. B-8; and Ralph Blumenthal, "Nazi Hunter Says CIA has Files on Man Accused of War Crimes," *The New York Times*, 17 September 1992, p. B10. (S)

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By the end of the 1940s, the CIA's initial reluctance to use pro-Nazi Germans and Eastern European collaborators as intelligence sources and, indeed, as operatives had waned considerably. The wartime roles of many of these individuals and groups became a negligible factor as the CIA began active operations behind the Iron Curtain. The Agency downplayed accounts of the brutality of many of the Eastern European émigré groups and their collaboration with the Nazis. DCI Hillenkoetter, for example, responding to an inquiry from the chairman of the Displaced Persons Committee in the spring of 1949 about the status of certain groups, stated:

A curious anomaly has developed since the end of the war. Several of these organizations (for example, the Melnik and Bandera groups and the Lithuanian Partisans) sided with the Germans during the war not on the basis of a pro-German or pro-Fascist orientation, but from a strong anti-Soviet bias. In many cases their motivation was primarily nationalistic and patriotic with their espousal of the German cause determined by the national interests. Since the end of the war, of course, these opportunistically pro-German groups remain strongly anti-Soviet and, accordingly, find a common ground with new partners.⁵⁹ (S)

Two years later, CIA admitted to the Immigration and Naturalization Service that it had hidden Stefan Bandera and other Ukrainians from the Soviets. "Luckily the [Soviet] attempt to locate these anti-Soviet Ukrainians was sabotaged by a few farsighted Americans who warned the persons concerned to go into hiding." Citing the Ukrainian resistance movement's struggle against the Soviets, the Agency believed that "the main activities of the OUN in the Ukraine cannot be considered detrimental to the United

⁵⁹DCI to Ugo Carusi, Chairman, Displaced Persons Commission, 7 April 1949, (C), in DCI Records, ☞ ☐, Box 13, Folder 538, CIA ARC. (C)

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States.” The Agency in 1951, at the same time as it defended Mykola Lebed, excused the illegal activities of OUN’s security branch in the name of Cold War necessity:

There are at least twenty former or active members of the SB of OUN/Bandera in the United States at the present time. Although the SB is known to have used extra-legal methods while investigating or interrogating suspected Soviet agents, there have been few cases to date where it was possible to pin a specific criminal activity on any individual belonging to the SB and take court action. Since the SB kept elaborate files and conducted investigations on Ukrainians and suspected Soviet agents of other nationalities, no serious attempt has ever been made by American officials in Germany to disband the SB Operating independently, the SB has upon occasion been more of a headache to American intelligence than a boon. Nevertheless in war-time a highly nationalistic Ukrainian political group with its own security service could conceivably be a great asset to the United States. Alienating such a group could, on the other hand, have no particular advantage to the United States either now or in war-time.⁶⁰ (S)

In summary, while American intelligence had contact with a number of groups in Western Europe in the years after World War II, it was not until after 1948 that the Central Intelligence Agency, still in its infancy, took steps to actually employ these groups in operations behind the Iron Curtain. The Office of Special Operations drew upon its Ukrainian contacts not only to fight the cold war in Germany and the Soviet Union, but brought one of the chief Ukrainian leaders, Mykola Lebed, to the United States to lead resistance efforts here. At the same time as OSO worked with the

⁶⁰Wyman to Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, “Vasyl GOGOSHA and the OUN/Bandera,” 23 May 1951 (signed by B.F. Kelly, Assistant Commissioner Enforcement Division on CIA letterhead), (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 5, CIA ARC. A copy of this document is also located in OGC Records, [redacted], Box 1, CIA ARC. John Loftus claims that Frank Wisner had this memorandum written. See John Loftus, *The Belarus Secret*, ed. Nathan Miller (New York: Paragon House, 1989, rev. ed. 1982), pp. 106-107. (S)

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Ukrainians to penetrate the Iron Curtain, a new CIA organization, albeit a sometime rival, joined in the struggle against world communism. The formation of the Office of Policy Coordination in 1948 accelerated the use of Nazis and their collaborators by American intelligence. (S)